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Abstract. Virtualization became recently a hot topic once again, af-
ter being dormant for more than twenty years. In the meantime, it has
been almost forgotten, that virtual machines are not so perfect isolating
environments as it seems, when looking at the principles. These lessons
were already learnt earlier when the first virtualized systems have been
exposed to real life usage. Contemporary virtualization software enables
instant creation and destruction of virtual machines on a host, live mi-
gration from one host to another, execution history manipulation, etc.
These features are very useful in practice, but also causing headaches
among security specialists, especially in current hostile network environ-
ments. In the present contribution we discuss the principles, potential
benefits and risks of virtualization in a de´ja` vu perspective, related to
previous experiences with virtualization in the mainframe era.
1 Introduction
Recently, a vigorous interest in various virtualization techniques has been
observed. Rather than being only a buzzword, virtualization became since
2005 a main direction in the evolution of the whole IT market. According
to recent predictions by the Gartner Group, operating system virtualiza-
tion and I/O virtualization will become mainstream by 2010 [1].
Traditionally, the leadership in providing virtualization based solu-
tions belonged to IBM, beginning with the VM/370 operating system
for System/370 mainframes introduced in 1972 [2]. With the advent of
relatively cheap microprocessor based computers within the next decade,
the IT industry shifted their interests to personal computing, based on
individual hardware computers rather than some virtual machines. But
at the beginning of the 21st century, most personal workstations and low-
end servers became powerful enough to carry multiple operating systems
running concurrently on the same hardware, which rised the interests
in virtualization once again, this time on the commodity x86 platform.
Moreover, it turned out from experience that setting up an extensive
IT infrastructure with a lot of dedicated hardware put together with the
appropriate, also dedicated software, is highly inefficient and also very ex-
pensive in management. Virtualization, leading generally to decoupling
of software from the underlying hardware, seems to have the potential for
substantial improvements in such situations.
In the meantime, virtualization software and virtualized systems be-
came already a target of new security threats, with possibly disastrous
consequences. In contrary to the widespread belief that, e.g., virtual ma-
chines should be way more secure than their physical equivalents, virtu-
alized computer systems may be sometimes less secure and even create
new security challenges.
In the present contribution we discuss the benefits as well as the risks
and problems of employing virtualization based IT solutions. The dis-
cussion is undoubtedly biased due to the authors’ experiences with vir-
tualization, first on various IBM mainframes many years ago and more
recently also on the x86 platform, where many problems appeared as de´ja`
vu. As already emphasized in the title, virtualization is like a double-edged
sword: a powerful weapon, but also quite dangerous for the warrior.
2 Background
When browsing through the literature, one could find several definitions
for virtualization, depending on the particular subject and its context.
Generally, virtualization creates new entities in a computer system which
are substitutes for the real ones, with the same functionality, interfaces
and behavior, except the timings which are usually different. The virtual
resources, created through such a substitution process, have to be even-
tually mapped to appropriate real resources, possibly going through more
than one level of indirection, if necessary.
The first and also the most important concept of a virtual entity in
computer systems was virtual memory, introduced and developed around
1956 by Fritz-Rudolf Gu¨ntsch [4] to unify various kinds of memory devices
within an experimental computer system built at TU Berlin. A couple of
years later the first commercial computer with memory virtualization on-
board was already built: the famous Atlas Computer [5] developed at the
University of Manchester with collaboration of Ferranti/ICL. Although
influential, the Atlas computer was known not to be working well in prac-
tical environments, mostly due to limited performance of the hardware
available at this time.
A more systematic approach to virtualization has been taken by IBM
engineers working on the System/360, the first computer family ”archi-
tected” according to common, precisely defined principles of operation.
In order to develop an interactive, multi-user system based on the al-
ready existing S/360 operating systems, facilitate time-sharing and at
the same time also protect the users from each other, they decided to
provide each user with a dedicated ”pseudo-machine”, a fake System/360
computer capable to run any other S/360 operating system. The term
”pseudo-machine” has been renamed soon to ”virtual machine”, when it
turned out that the latter term has been already used earlier at IBM Re-
search for an M44/44x experimental system, aimed at providing partially
virtualized “7044-like” virtual machines on a modified IBM 7044 36-bit
mainframe [6].
The intended full hardware virtualization per time-sharing user was
quite demanding and needed an appropriate support from the hardware
itself to run with acceptable performance. Such hardware support ap-
peared in only one System/360 computer: the famous System/360 Model
67. Regular hardware support for virtualization became reality a couple
of years later, within the System/370 family and not without exercising
some pressure from the “VM community” inside and outside IBM [7].
The first officially released version of VM/370 was able to provide an
exact functional copy of the underlying System/370 hardware, according
to the virtual machine configuration defined in the system directory. A
particular user could even run another copy of VM/370 on the virtual
hardware, e.g., to test a new version of system software without disrupt-
ing the running system.
The architecture of a “classical” VM/370 system, nowadays known
rather as hypervisor Type I architecture according to a widely accepted
classification, introduced by Robert P. Goldberg in his PhD thesis [8],
is sketched in Fig.1 below. The VM/370 hypervisor, or Control Program
(CP) in the original IBM terminology, represents here the software layer
implementing the virtual machines, each having exactly the same instruc-
tion set architecture (ISA) as the underlying System/370 hardware. This
approach enabled a peaceful coexistence of several operating systems with
different needs and applications, running in parallel on the same hardware
machine. In the example presented in Fig.1, one virtual machine runs
CMS, a simple operating system intended for individual usage, side-by-
side with the mammoth-size MVS, a general purpose multitasking and
multiuser operating system and even a second-level VM/370, running
concurrently with its own virtual machines. A direct communication with
the hypervisor was possible, and sometimes also necessary, through the
built-in CP command interface set up for each virtual machine according
to the assigned priviledge level. The seemingly perfectly isolated virtual
machines, running under the VM/370 hypervisor with carefully assigned
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Fig. 1. The “classical” VM/370 hypervisor (Type I)
priviledges, proved in practice to be totally insecure for intended intru-
sions, enabling even a total system penetration from a running VM, with
direct access to the real hardware and in the real supervisor state [9].
Virtual computer systems could be also created via emulation, where
appropriate software imitates another computer system or its part, e.g.
CPU. In principle, any operating environment could be emulated within
another operating environment, including exact copy of the hardware used
by the operating system executing the emulator software itself. Emulators
were originally intended to permit the execution of programs written for
another computer [10], i.e. for another ISA than employed on the host
computer system, but there is certainly nothing wrong with emulation of
the same ISA and the related I/O hardware, giving effectively another
kind of hypervisor: the so called Type II hypervisor [8].
Emulators and Type II hypervisors may run as ordinary applica-
tions within the host computer operating system, being totally decoupled
from the real hardware. Although it may be desirable e.g. for debug-
ging purposes, it means usually a very slow execution within the virtual
machine. A considerable speedup could be provided by the help of real
hardware, made available in parallel to the operating system services, usu-
ally through a specialized “Hybrid Virtualization” host operating system
driver, see the sketch in Fig.2.
HV drvrHost OS
Apps
Guest OS Guest OS
Hypervisor (Type II)
Apps Apps
Host system hardware
Fig. 2. A Type II hypervisor
Yet another approach to virtualization, a so called container-based
virtualization, is based on the mechanisms employed by contemporary
operating systems to establish a stardard execution environment for pro-
cesses: the “process virtual machine”. Augmented with mechanisms for
hiding and/or rewriting system-level data, the operating system kernel
itself could be used as a kind of “hypervisor” to confine the processes
within well-separated “execution containers”. As shown in Fig.3, the vir-
tualized system contains in this case a fully priviledged “Host VM” used
mainly for system management and several “Guest VMs”, which are
seemingly equivalent to separate hosts. The main advantage of container-
based virtualization is high performance and scalability with only a mini-
mal overhead introduced through the virtualization. Many contemporary
operating systems offer this possibility as a built-in or addon feature,
e.g., Zones/BrandZ in Solaris, Secure Resource Partitions in HP-UX or
VServer and OpenVZ/Virtuozzo for Linux.
3 x86 Virtualization
The constantly increasing performance of x86-based computers within the
last decade rised also the interest in virtualization on this platform. The
Intel Pentium “classical” IA-32 architecture has beed designed rather to
remain compatible with previous Intel processors than being virtualiz-
able, with exception of the “virtual 86” sub-mode intended for running
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Fig. 3. Container-based operating system level virtualization
“Multiple Virtual DOS Machines” in protected mode. Therefore, it is
quite challenging to implement virtualization software on this platform
(cf. [11,12] and references therein).
Due to the recent high demand for virtualization, the newest Intel
and AMD processors include a series of architectural extensions providing
hardware support for full virtualization, which simplifies also considerably
the implementation of x86-based “true” hypervisors (cf.[13,14]).
The most hardware independent way of virtualization is pure emu-
lation, where no instructions are being passed directly to the host hard-
ware. Several emulators exists for the x86 platform, the most advanced:
Bochs [15] and QEMU [16] are available for many host platforms, includ-
ing x86 itself. QEMU enhanced with kqemu module (a HV driver) works
efectively as a Type II hypervisor with almost native speed. The Kernel-
based Virtual Machine, available with recent Linux kernels, provides full
virtualization support with QEMU user-level frontend [17].
VMware Inc. [18], a pioneer of virtualization on the x86 platform,
offers since 1999 a whole line of proprietary x86 virtualization software.
The lowest-level products for workstations (VMware Player) and servers
(VMware Server, earlier known as GSX Server) are available as freeware
for MS Windows and also Linux. Similar virtualization products are of-
fered also by Microsoft: Virtual PC and Virtual Server, which became
also freely available last year as direct competitors to VMware products
on the MS Windows platform.
The Xen hypervisor, developed initially as research project at the
University of Cambridge [19], seems to be the most promising and dy-
namically evolving open-source virtualization software. Working generally
as a Type I hypervisor, Xen provides paravirtualized hardware for its vir-
tual machines when full virtualization is not possible, e.g. when working
on a Pentium host.
Paravirtualization enables a cooperation between the guest operat-
ing system and the hypervisor to circumvent virtualization problems and
increase performance. The operating systems intended for the paravirtu-
alized Xen virtual machines have to be ported to the Xen architecture,
which may become problematic in case of proprietary operating systems.
On the other hand, paravirtualized operating systems could perform even
better than their native versions running directly on the host hardware,
because the hypervisor may e.g. warrant apropriate resource allocations
[20].
Virtual machines established under the Xen 3 hypervisor may be
“live migrated” to another Xen 3 host computer, with only a very short
application-level downtime around 100-300 ms in a local network with
available network storage [21]. It has been demonstrated recently, that a
long-haul live migration is fairly possible even at a planetary level, with
downtimes rising only to 1-2 seconds for the distance between Amsterdam
and San Diego [22].
4 Applications and Benefits
Virtualization technologies can be used for many purposes. In the main-
frame era the virtualized resources were localized on a single host com-
puter and accesible only to a relatively small number of users. Today, the
possibility of migration of virtual machines from host to host, even in a
“live” state, makes a tremendous difference. A virtual machine could be
instantly created on some host, then moved elsewhere, e.g., when the host
becomes overloaded, or completely destroyed if not needed. With a proper
configuration, virtualized environments exhibit a sound level of isolation
from each other, hence a crash occuring in one environment should remain
unnoticed outside, which is a desired property for testbeds and security
systems.
4.1 Hardware Replacement
Virtual hardware may easily replace real hardware consuming precious
datacenter resouces like floor space, electricity or manpower. This is es-
pecially important for sites running older equipment, which may be not
easy to maintain, and at some point become even impossible to run, e.g.,
due to the lack of appropriate spare parts on the market. Virtualization is
often used for server consolidation, i.e. a reduction of the total number of
servers or even separate datacenters to a required minimum. At the same
time, software which became incompatible with the new hardware and/or
its configuration could be deployed within specialized virtual machines
when needed, e.g., for archival purposes. The possibility to migrate “live
machines” across networks gives additional flexibility in load balancing
and disaster recovery, enabling seamless movement of workloads between
distant datacenters practically without downtimes.
4.2 Testing and Debugging
Many virtualization systems, particularily emulators, were invented for
testing and debugging purposes, especially in the operating system kernel
development, where the experimental system have to be rebooted again
and again. Also, getting some data for debugging may be not easy on
a real hardware, requiring sometimes arcane equipment. On emulated
hardware, the same task could be a trivial recording to some log file. With
appropriate builtin hooks, any virtualization environment may serve as
a powerful debugger, with possibility of a “time travel”, i.e. arbitrary
navigation in the execution history [23].
4.3 Education and E-Learning
Virtual hardware is a very attractive possibility to have handy in any
educational computer laboratory, because the students may experiment
with various operating systems and network setups, without fighting with
problems related to running a multiplatform laboratory based on real
hardware [24]. For e-Learning purposes, such a “virtual laboratory” could
be made accesible remotely, e.g. from a standard web browser [25].
4.4 Security Systems
The isolation of applications running within a standard operating sys-
tem is usually based only of the process abstraction, with many facilities
available for data sharing, also in a system-wide manner. Virtual machine
technology may be therefore used to additionally isolate sensitive envi-
ronments and minimize the risk of compromising the entire system due
to problems in one of the environments.
Network services are usually regarded as particularily sensitive to se-
curity problems, related to the direct contact with the possible hostile net-
work surrounding. Therefore, a separate network frontend virtual machine
could be added to a virtualized system to handle the network connections
and redirect them appropriately. With intelligent network hardware ded-
icated to this virtual machine and a minimal hardened operating system
with integrated firewall, e.g. OpenBSD with pf, the overhead should be
negigible [26].
Much more demanding would be a virtual secure file server, estab-
lished to enforce a directory and file access control policy, even if the main
system become compromised [27]. It has been recently demonstrated that
a more elaborated configuration, with several dedicated virtual machines
and checkpointing, allows for an almost instant, automatical recovery af-
ter intrusion detection [28].
5 The Other Edge of Virtualization
Even in the mainframe era virtual machines were considered not secure
enough for hosting sensitive data, mainly due to the I/O handling in
VM/370 [9]. It turned out that a “hardening” by closing known security
holes does not guarantee the absence of other security flaws in the hard-
ened system, therefore a “security retrofit program” has been started to
design a formally verified “security kernel” for VM/370 [29].
There is no doubt that many hypervisors proliferating nowadays on
the x86 platform need much more than only closing the detected security
holes on the fly. Without similar, specific “security retrofit” programs it
would be pretty hard to avoid security problems. As shown in a very recent
study by Tavis Ormandy [30], the present state of security exposure from
implementation flaws in popular virtualization software is quite alarming.
With exception of Xen, all tested packages contained exploitable security
flaws, allowing a potential attacker to escape reliably from the confining
virtual machine.
The mobility of virtual machines, which could be easily migrated along
multiple domains, adds its own vulnerabilities. E.g., a virtual machine
may be moved into a faked recipient host (“kidnapped”) or compromised
while stored semewhere in transit. The ease of manipulations involving
virtual machines, which may be created on the fly, possibly immitating
another virtual/physical machine, then (mis)used for some purpose, and
subsequently destroyed or moved away could be also a source of many
security problems, unknown when working on dedicated hardware com-
puters. Static security arrangements are rather useless in this context.
As demonstrated recently [31], it is perfectly possible to hide malware
in a virtual machine running in parallel or force the host operating system
into a virtual machine, keeping the malware running outside. With latest
hardware enhancements for virtualization, it is also possible to do that
on the fly, without disrupting the running operating system [32,33].
6 Conclusions
When properly prepared and properly done, virtualization offers many
benefits in comparison with equivalent, contemporary available hardware
based solutions. In the next few years virtualization will become a stan-
dard way of computing in the enterprise, academia and personal use of
computers due to substantial savings and enormous flexibility.
The installation of operating systems and applications will quickly
become obsolete due to the possibility of preparation and distribution of
virtual appliances, tailored to the needs and ready to run on any computer
with the right hypervisor onboard.
When using virtualization for security, a security enhanced implemen-
tation with multilevel security [34] would be definitely recommended. A
secure hypervisor architecture, sHype developed at IBM [35], targeted at
the Common Criteria EAL4 assurance level, is now a part of the Xen
open-source hypervisor [36]. There are plans [37] for further elevation of
the Xen assurance level at EAL5 and then EAL6. A prototype system
for enforcing mandatory access control policies across a distributed set of
virtual machines has been also tested recently with the Xen hypervisor
[38]. Therefore Xen seems to be now the most advanced hypervisor with
a proven track record and clear evolution path in virtualization security.
Last but not least, virtual machines are in principle nothing more
than big fat programs with a complex inner life, executed on a usually
thin hypervisor layer, which in turn is in principle nothing more than a
specialized operating system. Looking from this perspective, there is no
doubt, that virtualization software have to be always kept up-to-date and
possibly equipped with a proper security add-on, exactly like ordinary op-
erating systems. And the virtual appliances/machines have to be treated
like ordinary executables, which are potentially corrupted, infected or
malicious.
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